1 A Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output (MI-MO) wiretap channel model is considered. The input is a twoantenna transmitter, while the outputs are the legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper, both equipped with multiple antennas. All channels are assumed to be known. The problem of obtaining the optimal input covariance matrix that achieves secrecy capacity subject to a sum power constraint is addressed, and a closed-form expression for the secrecy capacity is obtained. The sufficient and necessary condition for beamforming to be optimal is also given.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless physical layer based security approaches present an alternative to cryptographic approaches. They enhance the security of a communication system by exploiting the physical characteristics of the wireless channel. Wyner identified the secrecy capacity of the single user memoryless wiretap channel where the eavesdropper channel is assumed to be a degraded version of the legitimate channel [1] . In [2] , Wyner's model is generalized to a broadcast channel in which common messages are transmitted to two receivers and private messages are transmitted to receiver 1, while keeping receiver 2 as ignorant fo the private message as possible. Later, the Gaussian scalar wiretap channel was studied in [3] . More recently, the secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel under sum power constraints (Q 0, Tr(Q) ≤ P ) was analyzed in [4] , [5] and [6] , while the same problem under power-covariance constraints (Q 0, Q S with a known S) was studied in [7] and [8] . In [9] , the case (n T , n R , n E ) = (2, 2, 1) (two transmit antennas, two receive antennas and one eavesdropper antenna) was analyzed, and it was shown that under certain assumptions on the channels, beamforming is optimal. In [10] , the (2, 2, 2) case was studied under equality power constraint and the positive definiteness assumption H † E H E ≻ 0. However, the solution was not given, and moreover, it considers the equality power constraint rather than the more common inequality power constraint.
In this paper, we study the secrecy capacity for a MIMO wiretap channel with two transmit antennas and an arbitrary number of receive and eavesdropper antennas. The sufficient and necessary condition for beamforming to be optimal is derived. If beamforming is not optimal, a closed form expression for the secrecy capacity is obtained based on the roots of a quartic equation.
Notation -Upper case and lower case bold symbols denote matrices and vectors, respectively. Superscripts * , T and † denote respectively conjugate, transposition and conjugate transposition. det(A) and Tr(A) denote the determinant and trace of the matrix A, respectively. λ max (A) denotes the largest eigenvalue of the matrix A. A 0 denotes that the matrix A is Hermitian positive semi-definite, and A ≻ 0 denotes that the matrix A is Hermitian positive definite. |a| denotes the absolute value of the complex number a. I n denotes the identity matrix of order n (the subscript is dropped when the dimension is obvious).
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a MIMO wiretap channel, where the transmitter is equipped with n T = 2 antennas, while the legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper have n R and n E antennas, respectively. The received signals at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are respectively given by
where H R (n R × 2), H E (n E × 2) are respectively matrices representing the channel between transmitter and legitimate receiver, and transmitter and eavesdropper; x is the 2 × 1 transmitted signal vector with zero mean and 2 × 2 covariance matrix P Q, where P is the power constraint, Q 0 and Tr(Q) ≤ 1; n R and n E are Gaussian noise vectors with zero mean and covariance matrices σ 2 I n R and σ 2 I n E , respectively. We consider the scenario in which the transmitter has perfect channel state information (CSI) on H R and H E , which is a basic assumption in many literature such as [4] - [10] .
The secrecy capacity for this scenario is [5] , [6] C s max
where C s (Q) = log det(I + QS R ) − log det(I + QS E ) and [5] , a similar condition in terms of generalized singular value is derived based on the assumption that H E is full column-rank (please refer to its proof in [5, Sec. VII]).
In this paper, we assume that the condition in Lemma 1 holds which ensures C s > 0 and hence Q ⋆ = 0.
A. About assumption on CSI of eavesdropper
We assume that global CSI is available (a common assumption in the PHY security literature, e.g., [4] - [9] ), including the eavesdroppers' channels. This corresponds to the cases where the eavesdroppers are active in the network and their transmissions can be monitored [12] . For example, there are cases in which different nodes in the network have different levels of trust, or clearance (for example for example in military communication networks). Nodes with low level of trust might need to be excluded from certain information, and for all practical purposes can be treated as eavesdroppers. In that case, the positions and channels of those nodes are known. If the CSI of the eavesdroppers is not perfectly known, one may analyze the outage probability or ergodic secrecy rate; this is not within the scope of this paper, and can be our future work.
III. OPTIMALITY OF BEAMFORMING AND CLOSED FORM SECRECY CAPACITY

A. Optimality of beamforming
First, we study the optimality of beamforming solution (i.e., adding an additional constraint rank(Q) = 1).
Theorem 1:
1) The sufficient and necessary condition for beamforming to be optimal is that
and
2) If beamforming is optimal, then the secrecy capacity C s = log τ bf .
The quantities in Theorem 1 are defined below.
where a 1 , b 1 , c 1 , a 2 , b 2 , c 2 are entries of S R and S E , i.e.,
B. Closed form secrecy capacity
Second, we give a closed form secrecy capacity for the case in which beamforming is not optimal.
Theorem 2: Let τ 1 be the largest real root of the quartic equation
Then the secrecy capacity equals
Remarks: The quartic equation (9) can be solved by radicals (closed form) [14, p. 87] .
Discussion:
1) The methodology in deriving closed form secrecy capacity is as follows: We decompose Q as function of a vector u and a scalar x, and express the objective function as
Then exploiting generalized Rayleigh quotient to reduce the problem to an univariate problem in x.
The key is that: i) There is two degree of freedom (u and x) for a 2 × 2 Q; ii) The objective function can be expressed in a generalized Rayleigh quotient with respect to u. iii) The resulting univariate problem in x can be easily solved. Currently, there is no evidence that this trick can be extended to n T > 2 for general channel matrices. For rank(Q) > 2, it is impossible to express Q as function of u and x, and hence a multivariate fractional programming problem will follow. Since the objective function is a difference of two concave functions which is in general non-convex, such a non-convex multivariate fractional programming problem may not be easy to deal with. 2) Here we give exact secrecy capacity by simply solving a quadratic and a quartic equation. This result holds for any SNR. In [5] , secrecy capacity in the high-SNR regime is investigated.
C. Proof of Theorem 1 and 2
Proof of Theorem 1:
For the proof we need the following two lemmas. Lemma 2: Let e 1 = [1 0] T . Any 2 × 2 matrix Q = 0 with Q 0 and Tr(Q) ≤ 1 can be expressed as
where x is a real number with 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and u = 0 is a 2 × 1 vector with u † u ≤ 1.
Remarks: Here x = 1 corresponds to Q ≡ e 1 e † 1 which is equivalent to x = 0, u = e 1 . Thus, one may restrict 0 ≤ x < 1 alternatively.
Since C s > 0, it holds that Q ⋆ = 0. From Lemma 2, we let Q = xe 1 e † 1 + (1 − x)uu † with 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, u † u ≤ 1 and use Lemma 3 to rewrite C s (Q) as
where e 2 = [0 1] T . Here, to obtain (14), we have used the 
. Thus, either t = 0 or t = 1/(u ⋆ † u ⋆ ) achieves a larger objective value than t = 1. But this contradicts the optimality of u ⋆ .
From Lemma 4, we write
where
Note that G 1 (x) ≻ 0 and G 2 (x) ≻ 0. For fixed x, the optimal u is the unit-norm eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue of the matrix G 2 (x) −1 G 1 (x). The problem becomes
By using the fact that for a 2 × 2 matrix B,
we get (simply finding Tr(
and the coefficients p i 's and q i 's are given in (7) . Since G 1 (x) ≻ 0 and G 2 (x) ≻ 0 for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, it holds that that f i (x) > 0 for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, i = 1, 2, 3.
By letting x = 0 in (20), the secrecy rate for optimal beamforming vector is given by log τ bf where τ bf is given in (6) .
According to (20), the sufficient and necessary condition for beamforming to be optimal is that
We rewrite (24) as
which is equivalent to
(26) and further is equivalent to
First, we deal with s 2 (x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ [0, 1]. According to (6) , it holds that 2τ bf q 3 − p 3 ≥ 0, and τ 2 bf q 3 − τ bf p 3 + q 6 = 0.
(29) By using τ 2 bf q 3 − τ bf p 3 + q 6 = 0, it holds that
As a result, s 2 (x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ [0, 1] is equivalent to
Second, we deal with s 1 (x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ [0, 1]. Note that x = 1 corresponds to Q ≡ e 1 e † 1 which is not better than the optimal beamforming vector. Thus, it holds that s 1 (1) ≥ 0. On the other hand, according to (29), it holds that s 1 (0) = 2τ bf q 3 − p 3 ≥ 0. To proceed, we need the following lemma. 
The proof is simple and hence omitted here.
From Lemma 5, it holds that s 1 (x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ [0, 1] is equivalent to 
Proof of Theorem 2:
When beamforming is not optimal, the optimal x ⋆ satisfies 0 < x ⋆ < 1.
By using (20), the problem of (18) becomes
The equivalence of (35) and (36) can be verified as follows. Firstly, the second constraint in (36) can be rewritten as
We can show that for the optimal τ and x, it holds that 2f 2 (x)τ − f 1 (x) ≥ 0. Let us assume the opposite, i.e., 2f 2 (x)τ − f 1 (x) < 0. Then one can choose τ ′ =
But this contradicts the optimality of τ . With this fact, (37) leads to the second constraint in (35). Secondly, for the optimal τ and x, the second constraint in (35) holds with equality which leads to −τ 2 f 2 (x) + τ f 1 (x) − f 3 (x) = 0. The desired result follows. Next we solve the problem of (36). Denote
which can be rewritten as
One want to find the maximal τ (denoted as τ ⋆ ) such that there exists at least a x ∈ [0, 1] satisfying F (x) ≥ 0. In other words, for τ > τ ⋆ , there exists no x ∈ [0, 1] such that F (x) ≥ 0.
Since F (x) is a quadratic function, recalling that the optimal x ⋆ satisfies 0 < x ⋆ < 1, the above fact leads to: 1) A 1 = 0; and 2) x ⋆ is the repeated root of F (x) = 0, i.e.,
In fact, if x ⋆ is not the repeated root of F (x) = 0, then one can find τ = τ ⋆ + ǫ with an enough small ǫ > 0 such that there exists a x ∈ [0, 1] satisfying F (x) ≥ 0. This is because the two different real roots of a quadratic equation both depend continuously on its coefficients. But this contradicts the optimality of τ ⋆ . From the above analysis, one can find τ ⋆ by solving B 2 1 − 4A 1 C 1 = 0. This completes the proof.
IV. FUTURE WORK
In Monte Carlo experiments, it is found that the function given in (20), i.e., J(x)
) is a quasi-concave function. If this property holds, the necessary and sufficient condition for beamforming to be optimal is simply J ′ (x) ≤ 0. More important, if this property holds, it may reveal that if beamforming solution is a KKT point (stationary point), then beamforming is optimal. This is our future work.
On the other hand, a more realistic scenario is that imperfect CSI on the eavesdropper is available. In the future work, we will study the outage probability and outage secrecy rate under imperfect CSI scenario. .
We set ρ = 5 dB. The quantities are given as follows. τ bf = 10.8607; τ 2 bf q 2 − τ bf p 2 + q 5 = −7.3833 × 10 3 . In other words, (3) is not satisfied. Thus, according to Theorem 1, beamforming is not optimal. The quartic equation (9) has four roots 19.0710, 13.2768, 3.4529 ± 1.5230 × 10 −8 i, and τ 1 = 13.2768 with x = −B 1 /(2A 1 ) = 0.3189. Thus, the secrecy capacity is C s = log(τ 1 )/ log(2) = 3.7308 (bits/s/Hz) which is achieved at x ⋆ = 0.3189. The optimal input covariance matrix is Q ⋆ = 0.5435 −0.3198 + 0.0164i −0.3198 − 0.0164i 0.4565 which has rank two. Fig. 1 plots the secrecy capacity for different ρ.
Second, we change the previous example to n E = 1 and H E = [−1.2480 − 0.2893i, 4.6312 + 0.2417i]. It holds that H E (H † R H R ) −1 H † E > 1 (this is exactly the condition in [9, Lemma 1]). The quantities are given as follows. τ bf = 20.5293; τ 2 bf q 2 − τ bf p 2 + q 5 = 1.0539 × 10 5 ; (τ 2 bf q 1 − τ bf p 1 + q 4 ) + (τ 2 bf q 2 − τ bf p 2 + q 5 ) = 1.0744 × 10 4 ; 2τ bf q 1 − p 1 = −1.1308 × 10 4 . In other words, (3), (4) and (5) hold. Thus, according to Theorem 1, beamforming is optimal. This is consistent with the result in [9, Lemma 1]. The secrecy capacity is C s = log(τ bf )/ log(2) = 4.3596 (bits/s/Hz). 
VI. CONCLUSION
We have studied a Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel in which there exists a transmitter with two antennas, a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper both equipped with multiple antennas. The sufficient and necessary condition for beamforming to be optimal is derived. If beamforming is not optimal, we also derived the secrecy capacity in closed form.
